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ABSTRACT

This booklet examines the emergence of the so-called 'third world' of developing nations in the 1980s. The third world nations are widely diverse in history and culture, economic structure and political orientation. These new developing countries can affect the interests of the United States in significant ways, either individually or collectively. Chapters include: (1) "Introduction"; (2) "American Perspectives and Political Traditions"; (3) "Political and Strategic Interests"; (4) "Economic Interests"; (5) "The Political Process"; and (6) "Needed: A Development Strategy." Monographs in FPA's Headline Series are published approximately four times a year and are intended as a resource for teachers and students in the foreign policy area. Each monograph: is about a world area or topic; is written by a noted scholar; is brief (usually 64 pages); is written to be highly readable; and includes basic background, maps, charts, discussion guides, and suggested reading. (EH)

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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Headline Series

THE THIRD WORLD

ED 414 237

Exploring U.S. Interests

by
John W. Sewell
and
John A. Mathieson



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1

Introduction

At the beginning of the 1980s, relations between the United States and the developing countries seem to have come full circle. Over the preceding three decades, U.S. policy toward the nations that comprise the third world had gone through several phases. First there was a concern with alliances and aid designed to "contain" the Soviet Union. In the 1960s the emphasis shifted toward "nation-building" and winning the "hearts and minds" of people in the third world. The 1970s was a period of relative retreat, as the United States reacted to the Vietnam experience. The preoccupation with domestic problems was tempered only by a dawning awareness of America's dependence on certain developing countries—most notably for petroleum. The realities of dependence strengthened the links between developed and developing countries; at the same time they made the conduct of American foreign policy more difficult.

With the Reagan Administration, which came to office com-

This essay is adapted from a chapter contributed by the authors to a volume entitled Rich Country Interests and Third World Development *to be published by Croom Helm, Ltd., in Britain in August 1982. The book will be available in the U.S. from the Overseas Development Council in a limited paperback edition by special arrangement with Croom Helm.*

mitted to restoring America's economic health and rebuilding its military power, came another shift in emphasis. The Administration tends to view the developing countries primarily as an arena for East-West competition, a drain on scarce U.S. budgetary resources, and potentially unstable sources of key materials that are needed by the United States.

Today's world is very different from the bipolar world of the 1950s and 1960s, when the United States was the preeminent economic, political and military power. The U.S. position in the world economy is no longer unrivaled. Other major industrial countries, notably Japan, West Germany and the other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have greatly increased their economic competitiveness. So have a number of developing countries—not only the oil exporters, but such countries as Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. Consequently, the United States today is far more vulnerable to external economic shocks. Floating exchange rates, competition from imports, increasing reliance on raw materials from abroad and runaway oil prices have all signaled the end of the relative economic independence of the United States. These developments are making many Americans uneasy, and have added to concerns over the domestic performance of the U.S. economy.

Moreover, the United States and most other industrial nations are now beset with a combination of slow growth, high unemployment, and steep inflation. Most economists anticipate only marginal improvements in the economic outlook, and agree that a return to the spectacular growth rates experienced by much of the world in the 1950s and 1960s is unlikely before the mid-1980s, if then. The prospects are for slower growth in international trade (along with increasing pressures for restrictions), continued financial imbalances, and uncertainties in the supply and price of major commodities, such as food and oil.

The international system is far more complex today, in part because of the increased number of nations that are asserting economic and political weight. As recently as 1959 there were only 92 independent countries. By the beginning of the 1980s, the

GNP Per Capita by Major Regions

Region or country[1]	GNP per capita 1979 (US$)	GNP 1979 (millions US$)	Population mid-1979 (millions)
North America	10,560	2,597	247
Japan	8,730	1,010	116
Oceania	7,000	154	22
Europe, excluding U.S.S.R.	6,760	3,546	524
U.S.S.R.	4,040	1,067	264
Middle East[2]	4,310	207	48
South America	1,730	404	233
Central America[3]	1,620	172	106
Africa	700	322	456
Asia, excluding Japan and Middle East	310	677	2,165
World	2,430	10,156	4,181

Source: 1981 World Bank Atlas

[1] Afghanistan, Albania, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kampuchea, Korea Democratic Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Mongolia, Somalia, Tokelau, Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna, Western Samoa are excluded in the aggregation.

[2] Consists of Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of).

[3] Includes Mexico.

number had grown to 172. All of the new entrants were developing countries which—in some cases individually, and certainly collectively—can affect the interests of the United States in significant ways.

These countries make up the so-called third world. The "first world" represents the industrial market economies; the "second," the industrial nonmarket economies of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The third-world nations are widely diverse in history and culture, economic structure and political orientation. They actually fall into at least four groups, and even within the groups there are notable differences. The 13 members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have used their rising oil revenues to expand their economies and gain political

leverage. A small number of advanced developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and South Korea, have achieved high growth rates and export levels that put them almost in the ranks of the industrial countries. A large number of middle-income developing countries have attained some economic progress, but face many more hurdles on the way to further development. Finally, the poorest nations of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, sometimes referred to as the "fourth world," have seen little change in their economies over the past few decades. Their prospects are the bleakest in the third world.

Despite their varying needs and potential, the developing countries have exhibited a remarkable degree of unity vis-à-vis the industrial nations in international negotiations. In this "dialogue," the developing countries have become known collectively as the South, since most (but not all) of them lie in the Southern Hemisphere. The industrial countries have been collectively termed the North, since most (but again not all) are in the Northern Hemisphere.

For the past two decades the developing countries have been calling for reform of an international economic system they contend is inequitable. Their proposals—first formally presented at the United Nations in 1974—call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The demand is for comprehensive changes in rules governing trade and investment and in financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The rationale lies in the third world's dissatisfaction with the distribution of power, wealth and income among developed and developing countries. These gaps were first attributed to colonialism, but when political independence did not yield rapid economic gains, third-world leaders began to focus on inequities in the international economic system itself. The NIEO proposals cover a wide range: commodity-price-stabilization mechanisms; increased access to industrial-country markets for third-world exports; international monetary reform; cancellation or rescheduling of debt on a case-by-case basis; codes of conduct for multinational corporations; and, in general, greater third-world representation and voting power in international institutions.

B-1. The Development Gap, by Groups of Countries*

	Low-Income Countries		Lower Middle-Income Countries	Upper Middle-Income Countries	High-Income Countries
	(excl. China)				
W.C. 1981 Population (millions)	2 166.6	1 259.6	454.5	712.4	1 134.1
Average Per Capita GNP (1980)	$255	$225	$686	$1 800	$8 222
Average PQLI	58	43	56	68	93
Average Birth Rate (per 1 000)	30	39	38	34	16
Average Death Rate (per 1 000)	12	16	14	10	9
Average Life Expectancy (years)	59	51	53	62	72
Average Infant Mortality Rate (per 1 000 live births)	101	138	98	83	21
Average Literacy Rate	49%	38%	67%	67%	97%
Average Per Capita Education Expenditures	$9	$5	$15	$40	$373
Average Per Capita Military Expenditures	$15	$6	$24	$57	$318

Each country's PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) is based on an average of the combination of life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy

The third world's quest for reform has met with mixed success. Positive steps have been overshadowed by frustrations on the part of both industrial and developing countries. By the end of the 1970s, the Group of 77, the caucus of developing countries within the UN that now numbers about 120, stepped up its demands for global negotiations on a wide range of topics. Simultaneously, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, a private group of leaders from both North and South, popularly known as the Brandt Commission after its chairman, former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, proposed sweeping reforms in the international system and high-level discussions on world economic problems. This led to the North-South summit meeting of 22 heads of state from developed and developing countries at Cancún, Mexico, in October 1981.

The U.S. decision to participate in the Cancún summit brought a number of basic policy questions to the fore: What are this country's economic, political and strategic interests in the development of third-world nations? What kind of relations do we want with them? How will the changes that have taken place over the last three decades, both in the developing world and elsewhere, affect those relations?

*Table B-1 and the tables and maps on pages 11, 20, 21, 23, 30, 42, 53 and 59 are from *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982*, prepared by Roger D. Hansen and contributors, published by Praeger Publishers for the Overseas Development Council, New York, 1982.

determinants such as scarce natural resources or an inequitable social structure.

Individualism and Democracy. Since America is a nation of immigrants and their descendants who fled economic calamities, oppressive governments, and restrictive class structures, there are no rigid class divisions. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "The advantage of the Americans is that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are born equal, instead of becoming so." The "open frontier," in both a literal and psychological sense, had a profound impact on American society. Equality took on a special meaning: it referred not to political or economic leveling, as in a society striving to eliminate class barriers, but rather to "equality of opportunity"—the chance to improve one's own situation without barriers.

Traditionally, the individual is the cornerstone of the American social and economic order, and individual rights and participation form the foundation of political democracy. Governmental power is restrained under the maxim of "he who governs least, governs best."

Americans tend to feel that diffusion and decentralization are preferable to the concentration of power, and to this day they remain suspicious of central government. For many developing countries, however, the principal concern may not be the evils of an omnipotent central authority but rather the need for the government to mobilize national energies. Despite this philosophical clash, U.S. preoccupation with individual liberty and the need to check sometimes arbitrary central governments has prompted some developing countries to pay greater attention to human and political rights than they might otherwise have done.

Revolution and Social Change. Americans like to think of their country as a former colony, a state created by revolution. Yet the American Revolution had a special character: it was neither radical nor ideological, but "practical," designed to relieve the former colonists of the burden of a distant government which seemed determined to exploit them. Unlike the French Revolu-

2

American Perspectives and Political Traditions

The ways in which Americans look at third-world countries and their development are shaped by ingrained and sometimes unconscious attitudes and values rooted in the American political system and its institutions.

Abundance. American political and economic traditions were shaped by settlers on a continent blessed with almost unlimited space, rich resources, sparse population, and the absence of a rigid social structure. This combination gave free rein to individual initiative. There was little need to face the difficult choice of how to divide existing assets as long as they seemed limitless, and differences over the redistribution of riches rarely arose.

Given their national experience of relative physical abundance and few social and political constraints, Americans tend to assume that "change and development are easy," according to political scientist Robert A. Packenham. Thus, when economic progress does not take place, at home or abroad, the tendency is to put the blame on lack of initiative, rather than on other

tion, the American Revolution was an effort not so much to build an improved society on the ruins of the old, but rather to build a new society in a new environment.

Americans tend to believe strongly that "radicalism and revolution are bad," to quote Packenham, and that the costs of violent social upheaval are never worth the gains. This belief is founded on the American experience which suggests that moderate reformist solutions to political conflict produce a wealthy society. The United States tends to see radical change as a disruptive and even counterproductive force. This view overlooks the fact that extremely scarce resources and a highly structured class system make moderate and gradual change in many developing countries extraordinarily difficult. In addition, abrupt change is now usually seen as opening opportunities for this country's adversaries, notably the Soviet Union and its allies.

Economic Liberalism and Attitudes toward Poverty. The influence of classical liberal economic thought remains very strong in the United States. Americans generally believe that the market mechanism should be allowed free rein, even though occasional government intervention—such as the bail-out loan to the Chrysler Corporation granted by Congress and signed by President Jimmy Carter early in January 1980—may be necessary. Considerable segments of the American public oppose most forms of domestic regulation and planning, and as a result governmental intervention is considerably more limited in the United States than it is in other industrial countries. The opposition to domestic regulation and planning is particularly marked in the Reagan Administration.

This preference for economic liberalism and free-market economies makes many Americans less than enthusiastic about discussing proposals for a new international economic order, many of which imply a larger role for government in the economy. There are, however, two other developments in the third world which strike responsive chords among Americans and are compatible with traditional American beliefs. First is the progress scored by certain middle-income countries such as Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan. These countries are seen as

F-9. Private Voluntary Assistance from DAC Countries,* Net Flow, 1970 and 1980

	Total Contribution ($ millions)		Per Capita Contribution ($)		Contribution as Share of GNP (%)	
Countries[1]	1970	1980	1970	1980	1970	1980
Norway	4	33	1.01	8.07	.03	.06
Switzerland	11	53	1.74	8.32	.05	.05
Sweden	25	59	3.13	7.09	.08	.05
Germany	78	421	1.28	6.84	.04	.05
United States	**598**	**1,301**	**2.92**	**5.84**	**.06**	**.05**
Netherlands	5	79	.40	5.59	.02	.05
Belgium	15	45	1.54	4.57	.06	.04
Canada	52	102	2.42	4.26	.06	.04
Finland	1	16	.17	3.35	.01	.03
Austria	4	24	.49	3.20	.03	.03
Australia	16	40	1.26	2.73	.05	.03
New Zealand	1	7	.50	2.24	.02	.03
Denmark	3	13	.61	2.54	.02	.02
United Kingdom	34	105	.61	1.88	.03	.02
France	6	36	.12	.67	.004	.006
Japan	3	26	.03	.22	.002	.003
Italy	5	3	.09	.05	.01	.001
DAC Total	**861**	**2,361**	**1.36**	**3.53**	**.04**	**.03**

[1]Ranked according to 1980 grants by voluntary agencies as a percentage of 1980 GNP.

SOURCES: ODC table based on DAC, *1975 Review*, pp. 206-17, and *1981 Review* (Preliminary), Tables A.10 and H.1.

*"DAC countries" refers to members of OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

up-and-coming entrepreneurs who have emerged from the mass of poor developing countries by following the capitalist path—in some ways more successfully than the United States itself. Hence they deserve the respect of industrialized countries and serve as an example for other developing countries.

Second, third-world poverty has aroused the same strong humanitarian spirit that Americans have traditionally shown the poor at home. The amount of private assistance given by individual Americans through nongovernmental organizations runs at a very high level. In 1980, for example, Americans

contributed $1.3 billion in foreign aid through private agencies—an amount only slightly smaller than disbursements under the U.S. government's bilateral economic assistance program. The United States has also accepted large numbers of immigrants and refugees from developed and developing countries—nearly 2.3 million from 1975 to 1979.

The government's concern with poverty is relatively recent. Until this century the elimination of poverty was largely left to private charities. When the government began to help the poor, its aim was not to remove or lessen inequalities of income but rather to raise individuals above a certain threshold of absolute poverty. With their basic needs cared for, it was assumed that individuals would be able to compete equally.

The same pattern emerges in America's international policies: Facilitating equality of opportunity is considered a praiseworthy objective, but any attempt to level incomes would be a fruitless and needless task. While one must strive to abolish poverty, there is no need to tackle relative income inequalities either within or between countries. The American support for programs aimed at meeting basic human needs in the developing countries and opposition to proposals for a new international economic order are consistent with this deep-seated national belief.

3

Political and Strategic Interests

American interests in the developing countries in a very general sense are a reflection of the global interests that have shaped U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Briefly stated, the broad goals have included the following:

1. To maintain world peace and to avoid a repetition of the world wars experienced in this century, particularly the outbreak of a nuclear war which would threaten human existence itself. To this end the United States maintains a large military establishment and promotes the peaceful settlement of disputes.

2. To contain the influence of those nations seen as fundamentally opposed to the American system of values. This goal, most marked in regard to the Soviet bloc, implies the need to maintain or strengthen the economic and political stability of U.S. allies.

3. To maintain an open world economy and protect U.S. access to foreign markets and sources of critical supplies.

4. To encourage the adoption by other nations of such principles as self-determination, the right of individuals to have a voice in decisions that affect them, and basic political and social rights, which are the foundation of America's political system.

Although these objectives are shared by the overwhelming majority of the American people, there are broad differences of opinion on their relative merits and the best way to achieve them. Is maintaining stability in a country which is considered an ally best served by providing arms, or by assisting its economic development? The answer frequently is not clear-cut.

The pursuit of U.S. strategic goals is complicated by several important factors. In general, U.S. relations with the developing countries are far less predictable than those with either industrial-country allies or even the Soviet Union. In general, the countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan are not threatened by serious instability. A number of developing countries, on the other hand, are afflicted by both internal problems and vulnerability to outside forces—an explosive combination that often makes for unexpected change and complicates policy formulation. Iran, Libya and El Salvador are all clear examples. Finally, much more attention in Washington has been focused on North Atlantic and East-West relations than on America's relations with the developing countries. As a result there is less understanding and knowledge of third-world countries. They tend to be neglected until a crisis erupts, as in Central America, or they gain economic leverage, as did the oil exporters.

As *The New York Times* correspondent Leslie Gelb noted after the Ottawa economic summit in July 1981, "The most serious difficulties for leaders of the Atlantic alliance have usually been not in Europe but in the gray areas of the third world—Korea in 1950, Dienbienphu [French Indochina] in 1954, Suez in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Vietnam war, and, more recently, Iran and Afghanistan. This is where the fighting has been, and where the danger of conflict with the Soviet Union has been greatest." The rivalry between East and West will continue to be played out on the soil of developing countries.

While no developing country threatens the sanctity of American borders in a military sense, the United States has historically viewed the security and stability of Mexico, Central America, and certain Caribbean nations as essential to its own security.

Expropriations of U.S. firms, terrorism, and the seizure of U.S. hostages in Iran have confirmed that even relatively powerless nations can determine the security of Americans abroad.

In addition, certain third-world nations control or border on major sea-lanes (the Panama and Suez canals, the Strait of Malacca, Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope, etc.) and other transportation routes, such as oil pipelines which cross their borders or are contiguous to them. Developing countries are of growing importance to international economic stability, and to the U.S. economy in particular. They are inextricably involved in the entire range of U.S. strategic and political interests, even at a time when the latter are dominated by America's relations with the Soviet Union.

U.S. Expansionism

The United States first became actively involved in the third world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when America emerged from relative isolation and began acting as a global power, intervening in the affairs of other countries when it suited its purposes. There were many reasons for the shift from insular to expansionist power: a desire to emulate the Europeans, who had colonized Africa and Asia; the transformation of the economy from agriculture to manufacturing; the end of the seemingly limitless open frontier; the increasing acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution, with its supposedly biological evidence of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. The growing concept that sea power was essential to world power had prompted the United States to build a large modern navy. It planted the flag first in Alaska, Hawaii and Samoa, and then, as a result of the Spanish-American War, in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Successive American governments asserted an active claim to hegemony in Latin America (thereby extending the Monroe Doctrine), particularly in the Caribbean, where U.S. military interventions in Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic became commonplace. In the Pacific, the United States was determined not to be shut out of the China market by the great powers—England, France, Russia, Germany—and to maintain an Open Door policy.

It also sought to expand relations with Japan. In comparison, little attention was paid to Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, all of which were under colonial rule.

Americans were not wholly supportive of U.S. expansionism. Certain groups vigorously opposed the existence of U.S. colonies, both on moral grounds and in the belief that foreign commitments were dangerous. In the 1920s and 1930s the country resumed its traditional isolationism, which was shattered only by World War II. The war and the postwar concern with containing the Soviet Union led to the extension of American military power throughout the developing world. Worries over the Communist threat strongly influenced U.S.-third world relations—economic, technical and military. Still today the United States has defense alliances and treaties with 26 different third-world countries, mainly in Asia and Latin America.

Retrenchment

American strategic thinking about the developing countries began to change in the late 1960s, influenced strongly by the long and fruitless American involvement in Vietnam. The emphasis shifted from the direct use of U.S. troops to an increased reliance on friendly governments and local forces. This new policy—the so-called Nixon Doctrine—had a corollary: the United States would continue to supply the arms, equipment, and other forms of support necessary to help developing-country allies counter external aggression or internal subversion, led or inspired, presumably, by the U.S.S.R. or China. One of the direct results of this shift in strategy was that the United States became one of the largest suppliers of arms to the world: between 1969 and 1978 U.S. arms transfers grew in constant dollars from $5.7 billion to $6.2 billion. Over three fourths of world arms transfers in 1978 went to the developing countries, primarily in Asia and the Middle East.

During much of the postwar period there was a consensus concerning American interests in the third world. The policy of containing the Soviet Union and China meant denying them political or ideological influence in the newly independent states.

The U.S. mission was to stimulate the economic development of the poor countries and to encourage liberal economic and democratic systems to take root. In the late 1960s, however, this consensus evaporated, and by the early 1970s, many Americans felt there was little reason for deeper involvement in the third world. In 1971 the U.S. Senate even temporarily voted to end the U.S. foreign assistance program.

Détente was in the air. By 1972 U.S.-Soviet relations had thawed to the point where a continued reduction of tensions and broader economic and cultural relations seemed assured. From the American perspective, one of the implicit ground rules of détente was an acceptance of the status quo in the third world. Consequently, it was assumed that the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere would recede.

By late 1973, though, U.S. attention was once more riveted on the developing countries. The immediate concern was not the Soviet Union but the oil embargo, followed by a fourfold increase in the price of oil by OPEC, and the growing world food crisis caused by drought and production shortfalls. For the first time many Americans realized, as they waited in line to fill their gas tanks, that developing countries could directly and immediately affect their well-being by controlling access to critical raw materials. The third world's political and strategic influence, previously discounted as relatively insignificant, had made itself felt at a time when U.S. worries about the role and intentions of the Soviet Union were beginning to rise dramatically. Part of the disenchantment with détente in the late 1970s stemmed from growing concern over Soviet activities in Ethiopia and South Yemen and Soviet support for Cuban troops in Angola and Mozambique. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the "discovery" of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and the ouster of Somoza in Nicaragua, the loss of U.S. influence in Iran and civil war in El Salvador strengthened those concerns. The Soviet Union, it appeared to many Americans, was once again aggressively seeking to extend its influence.

4

Economic Interests

Before 1900 American economic involvement in the developing countries was insignificant. The United States itself was a developing country: it traded raw materials and food to Europe for manufactured goods. In most years before the turn of the century, the U.S. balance of payments showed current account deficits being offset by net capital inflows. The latter helped finance America's development. Not until after World War I did the United States record net investment outflows.

As the economy matured, American business became more active in developing countries. By 1929, almost half of the total U.S. foreign direct investment was located in Latin America, not quite three times as much as investment in Western Europe. In the same year, nearly one fifth of total U.S. exports were sold to Latin America, and Latin America supplied a quarter of U.S. imports. Following the Great Depression of the 1930s, U.S. economic relations with other developing countries, especially the Middle East and Far East, grew in intensity. It was during the 1970s, however, that economic links between the United States and developing countries expanded rapidly to create significant levels of interdependence.

Despite the growing importance of these economic relations, the United States has always had a hard time in setting policy toward the third world. First, the importance of those relations is largely ignored due to the historical insulation of the U.S. economy and the primary concern with economic ties with the industrial countries. Second, the level and forms of transactions with the third world and their impact on U.S. interests tend to be underestimated. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, different domestic economic sectors disagree over individual policy issues, and as a result difficult decisions tend to be postponed or compromised.

Trade

The third world as a whole represents the largest market for U.S. goods. Developing countries purchased about 38 percent of total U.S. exports in 1980, a share greater than that sold to the European Community, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China combined. Developing countries purchase an average of 23 percent of industrial-country exports—a significantly smaller share than the 38 percent they buy from the United States.

While the composition of U.S. trade with individual developing countries varies enormously, as a whole it follows a predictable pattern. The United States sells machinery, trucks, aircraft and other transport equipment, relatively sophisticated manufactures such as computers and communications systems, and agricultural products to the developing countries. It buys oil, raw materials, tropical foodstuffs, and labor-intensive consumer goods such as clothing and shoes. Predictably, trade has developed broadly according to comparative advantage. The United States has a relative abundance of land, capital, and technology whereas some developing countries have a relative abundance of natural resources and labor. Because of the great discrepancy in comparative advantage, U.S. trade with developing countries probably creates more economic gains than trade with other developed countries. The latter tend to exchange similar products.

Since the United States buys more than it sells, it runs a

A-3. U.S. Exports to and Imports from Developed and Developing Countries



significant merchandise trade deficit with the third world—a deficit which amounted to some $34 billion in 1979 and which by 1980 had climbed to $36 billion. These deficits have raised complaints that the United States is "exporting jobs," particularly in such visible and highly sensitive industries as textiles, shoes and consumer electronics. The aggregate figure, however, is deceiving. Of the total $116 billion in U.S. imports from developing countries in 1980, some 58 percent—$67 billion—was accounted for by gas, oil and petroleum products. In terms of manufactured goods, the United States continues to record large surpluses with the third world: some $26 billion in 1980. The third world buys some 40 percent of total U.S. exports of manufactures as well as large amounts of agricultural products. These exports probably account for one out of every 20 jobs in manufacturing in this country.

U.S. imports of manufactured goods from the third world, on the other hand, are growing so rapidly that they now amount to over one fourth of total manufactured imports. Over the 1970–79 period they grew at an average rate of 27 percent per year compared to an average growth rate of 19 percent for U.S. imports of manufactures from all sources. In 1980 the United

D-9. U.S. Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance, 1980
(S billions)



NOTES: Total world export and import figures include U.S. trade with unidentified countries not otherwise shown on this table. Export and import figures are f.a.s. (free alongside ship) transaction values.

SOURCE: ODC table based on U.S. DOC, Highlights of U.S. Trade (1980), Tables E-3 and I-6.

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States bought 27 percent of its manufactured goods from the developing countries, compared to 16 percent in 1965. Many of these imports require labor-intensive production and compete with relatively stagnant sectors in the U.S. economy. This type of trade leads directly to the classical case of increased efficiency in the economy as a whole and welfare gains to consumers, but loss of jobs in declining industries.

Many of these imports are less expensive than domestic products of equal quality. A 1979 analysis, carried out by economist William Cline and based on a survey of actual U.S. retail sales, found that imports from developing countries were as much as 16.3 percent cheaper than their domestically produced counterparts of comparable quality. By comparison, imports from developed areas were only marginally less expensive (0.4 percent) than comparable U.S. goods. Overall, American consumers were estimated to save more than $2 billion per year as a direct result of purchasing less-expensive imports. This is particularly important for low-income consumers. According to the study, they save as much as 13.1 percent on the purchase of imported goods rather than domestic goods.

The savings to consumers are dispersed widely throughout the economy, while the loss of jobs is concentrated in a relatively few slow-growth industries. Therefore imports from the third world have become a highly politicized issue, overshadowing such other causes of job displacement as automation and shifts in demand. Even though the overall employment effects of these imports are negligible (affecting perhaps one tenth of one percent of employment per year), the fact that they are highly visible has led unions and firms to focus a large amount of attention on them.

In response to these conflicting interests, the U.S. government has adopted a policy of keeping domestic markets relatively open to manufactured imports from developing countries, but at the same time placing controls on those imports like textiles, footwear and television sets which have been growing at above-normal rates. Sensitive products have been excluded from the U.S. general system of preferences, which permits certain developing-country products to come in duty-free. The United States

D-12. Developing-Country Share of U.S. Imports and Exports (percentages)

In 1979, 20.8 per cent of U.S. manufactures imports and 86.7 per cent of U.S. fuel imports came from developing market economies. More than a third (36.9 per cent) of U.S. exports of manufactured products were purchased by the developing countries.

	Developing Market Economies					Non-OPEC Developing Market Economies					OPEC				
	Total	Food	Raw Materials	Fuels	Manufactured Products[1]	Total	Food	Raw Materials	Fuels	Manufactured Products[1]	Total	Food	Raw Materials	Fuels	Manufactured Products[1]
	(percentage share of category)					(percentage share of category)					(percentage share of category)				
IMPORTS															
1960	22.4	62.0	37.1	80.1	12.0	24.8	57.8	29.6	24.3	11.7	7.6	4.2	7.5	55.8	0.3
1975	40.5	57.1	58.6	78.9	16.2	24.7	53.6	32.2	23.7	15.9	15.8	3.3	6.4	55.2	0.3
1979	44.9	56.7	62.9	86.7	20.8	23.4	51.3	28.0	21.0	20.5	21.5	5.4	4.9	65.7	0.3
EXPORTS															
1960	30.9	35.3	21.6	22.2	32.9	26.0	32.0	19.4	20.5	26.7	4.9	3.3	2.2	1.7	6.2
1975	35.6	36.6	25.4	16.0	36.4	25.7	29.1	21.1	14.7	25.0	10.1	7.5	3.7	1.3	11.4
1979	34.6	32.7	24.3	18.1	36.9	26.2	24.2	21.7	16.1	27.1	8.6	8.5	2.6	2.0	9.8

Food, beverages, and tobacco.
Includes crude animal or seeds, nuts and kernels, textile fibres, crude fertilizers and minerals, and metalliferous ores and metal scrap.
Includes chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and other manufactured products.

SOURCE: ODC table based on U.N. *Monthly Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 5, May 1981, Special Table D.

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Raw Materials from Developing Countries Used in U.S. Industry
Imports from Developing Countries as Percent of U.S. Consumption



Source: AID, Based on the latest available data from the U.S. Bureau of Mines.

has also taken the lead among industrialized countries in urging the advanced developing countries (ADCs) such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea to "graduate," that is, to receive less preferential treatment and open their own markets to both developed and other developing countries. This policy of maintaining modified access to third-world goods and applying pressure for ADC trade liberalization is not likely to be altered in the foreseeable future.

Commodities

Though a major commodity producer in its own right, the United States depends heavily on the third world for many strategic materials. For example, in 1978, U.S. net imports from developing-market economies accounted for 93 percent of domestic consumption of tin, 88 percent of columbium, 56 percent of aluminum and 35 percent of manganese. Literally all such items as rubber, coffee, cocoa, hard fibers and jute come from the third world. On the other hand, the United States

produces large quantities of minerals such as iron, lead, copper, and phosphates, but it consumes most of these domestically.

Concern over the supply of key industrial raw materials, particularly those produced by South Africa and the U.S.S.R., has prompted a debate on the possibility of future "resource wars." Most analysts have concluded that these fears are exaggerated. Producer-governments, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), which have 96 percent of the known deposits of chromium, will continue to sell resources because they need foreign exchange, and importing countries can buffer any possible short-term disruptions by such measures as building stockpiles.

Despite America's demonstrable interest in world trade of commodities—including access to supplies at reasonable prices; expansion of sales of U.S. commodities, again at remunerative prices; assuring that world demand is largely met—for humanitarian reasons as well as avoiding the disruptions caused by shortages; damping major fluctuations in commodity prices; and promoting sufficient investment in raw material industries to satisfy growth in demand—its policy does not conform to the general notion of the U.S. interest. The United States has consistently rejected an integrated approach for dealing with all major commodities at the same time, preferring instead a case-by-case approach where specific U.S. producer and consumer interests can be identified and balanced. It has also actively resisted the growth and questioned the efficacy of producer cartels. OPEC's success in unilaterally raising the price of petroleum has only hardened U.S. opposition. Finally, the United States perhaps more than any other country has been ambivalent in its attitude toward market intervention. On the one hand, it extols the virtues of market mechanisms and castigates the evils of administered prices. On the other hand, it has a long history of market interventions—subsidies, price floors (for wages and agricultural products) and price ceilings (on oil).

Ironically, while it has been the developing countries that have pressed for commodity agreements, the largest measurable economic benefits from commodity price stabilization would

accrue to the United States and the other industrial countries in the form of reduced inflationary pressures, according to an econometric analysis carried out in the late 1970s by economist Jere R. Behrman.

American ambiguity on commodity issues is reflected in a series of wide-ranging policy decisions. Historically, the United States has participated in commodity agreements on sugar and coffee. But when the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1974 proposed an Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC), the United States initially opposed it, probably for fear of new cartels. In recent years, however, Congress approved implementing legislation for participation in the International Sugar and Coffee Agreements. The United States has joined an International Rubber Agreement and participates in the current tin agreement, but will not join the new tin agreement scheduled to begin in mid-1982. The United States also participated in the recently concluded negotiations on a new International Cocoa Agreement, but has yet to join.

Initially a strong opponent of the proposal for a Common Fund, a new international institution designed to finance commodity agreements, the United States eventually agreed to its formation in 1978, but succeeded in limiting the amount of direct government contributions to the fund. It has also declined thus far to contribute to the "second window," a mechanism within the Common Fund to finance third-world efforts at diversification, market promotion, and research and development.

On a separate but related issue, the United States participated in the negotiation of an International Wheat Agreement which failed to reach a consensus on reserve stock levels or price bands among major producers and consumers. The agreement finally collapsed due to developing-country disagreement over stockpile release prices and maintenance costs.

In sum, the United States appears to have taken a gradualist approach. It has done some tough bargaining in an attempt to meet the current interests of domestic producers and consumers, but in so doing may have sacrificed long-term objectives to short-term concerns.

The Food Issue

One commodity of particular importance to the United States is cereal grains—wheat, maize and rice—of which it is the world's largest exporter, accounting for some 60 percent of total world trade in 1980–81. The 40 percent of these exports that go to the developing countries constitute nearly two thirds of the latter's imports. If control of a vital resource is a mark of national strength, then food is surely one important element of U.S. strength—especially vis-à-vis the third world.

Besides meeting domestic consumption requirements, U.S. agricultural production brought in more than $41 billion in export earnings in 1980, a significant contribution to the balance of payments. With a population of only 5 percent of the world total, the United States produces 15 percent of the world's wheat (the major food grain traded), 27 percent of the world's coarse grains (mainly maize), and 60 percent of the world's soybeans. Though a small producer, the United States is the world's leading rice exporter. U.S. corporations, operating in the relatively unregulated U.S. market, dominate international grain trade.

One out of three U.S. farm acres produces for export, and about one out of five for export to developing countries. U.S. farmers depend on developing countries for about two fifths of their export market. Developing-country net grain imports increased fourfold between 1960 and 1980, and the bulk of this increase came from the United States. The $20 billion of U.S. food imports, chiefly from developing countries, included mainly coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, and tropical fruits and vegetables.

In addition to its leadership in production and trade, the United States holds a major share of world stocks of such basic food commodities as wheat, coarse grains, and oilseeds (mainly soybeans). These stocks are vital for providing food aid and emergency assistance to refugees and for responding to harvest shortfalls and natural disasters. Not only regular U.S. food exports, but also the large proportion of food stocks held in the United States, are important factors in the U.S. pursuit of its interests in the third world.

The growing demand for U.S. grain in the developing countries has raised questions about America's ability to continue indefinitely "feeding the world." Competition for agricultural land, rising production costs, reduction in soil productivity, growing energy dependence, lowering of underground water tables, environmental deterioration, crop vulnerability due to monoculture (especially of grains), leveling off of research activity, and climatic changes have all hurt U.S. agricultural output. Although dramatic scientific and technological breakthroughs might possibly produce another Green Revolution, a gradually declining production growth rate is more likely for the next decade or two.

As the dominant world food producer, the United States has an opportunity to play a leadership role in improving global food security and the international food system. It is in the U.S. self-interest to do so. Unless worldwide production patterns change, the United States will find it steadily more difficult to meet the rising international demand for cereals, especially in the third world, without a sharp escalation in prices. It is to the U.S. advantage, therefore, to encourage developing countries to increase investments in agriculture; to adopt appropriate incentives, especially price incentives, to encourage their farmers to produce; and to help them increase their food production and improve its distribution. Food aid buys time and can assist development, but it cannot over the long term make up for food deficits in the developing countries.

Energy

The United States consumes more energy than it produces. It seeks sufficient supplies of energy at predictable prices (which is not necessarily the same as low or unchanging prices) for adequate but prudent use by industry and individuals. Historically, U.S. consumption has been less than prudent. Decades of abundant supplies and declining real prices led to wasteful consumption. In 1979, per capita consumption of energy in the United States, about 12,350 kilograms of coal equivalent, was more than 56 percent higher than the average consumption of

industrialized countries (7,892 kilograms), and nearly 100 times that of low-income countries other than China and India (129 kilograms). The reduced supply of oil and price rises of the 1970s only recently began to alter the pattern. The delay was due largely to domestic policy. Because the price of domestic output was regulated, the cost to consumers was well below the level of other countries. Consumption relative to output began to decrease sharply only as prices rose and sharpened the incentives to conserve. The decision in 1981 to decontrol domestic oil prices entirely should accelerate the trend to conservation.

The problem of high U.S. consumption of energy has hurt nearly all other areas of economic relations with both developing and developed countries. U.S. imports of gas, oil and petroleum products, totaling $79 billion in 1980, have been primarily responsible for U.S. trade deficits. These deficits in turn have at times reinforced protectionist sentiments toward nonoil imports. Consumption patterns cannot be changed overnight, but reduced U.S. demand for energy is clearly in the best interest of the United States, other industrialized countries, and developing countries. This point has been made by officials from OPEC and other OECD countries with increasing frequency and decreasing subtlety over the past several years. The current oil glut and price softening may be only a temporary phenomenon, but it already appears to be undermining the long-term objective of energy conservation.

Increased U.S. dependence on OPEC energy supplies has led the United States to alter its strategy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and to attempt to improve its often-neglected relations with such other major producers as Mexico and Nigeria, currently the second largest supplier of oil to the United States.

In the longer run, energy shortages, whether in terms of physical supplies or in the form of high production costs, have the potential to dampen the growth prospects and welfare of all countries. The United States, like other countries, therefore has an interest in the expansion of world energy production, the attainment of greater energy self-sufficiency by the developing

A-6. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Developing Countries, 1967 and 1980 ($ millions and percentages)

	1967 ($ millions)	1967 (% of region)	1967 (% of total)		1980 ($ millions)	1980 (% of region)	1980 (% of total)
Latin America	**10,102**	**100.0**	**68.1**	**Latin America**	**27,401**	**100.0**	**52.4**
Venezuela	2,081	20.6		Brazil	7,546	27.5	
Mexico	1,426	14.1		Mexico	5,940	21.7	
Brazil	961	9.5		Panama	3,190	11.7	
Other Latin America	5,634	55.8		Other Latin America	10,725	39.1	
Africa	**1,492**	**100.0**	**10.0**	**Africa**	**3,730**	**100.0**	**7.1**
Libya	350	23.5		Egypt	1,029	27.6	
Nigeria	271	18.2		Libya	577	15.5	
Zambia	138	9.3		Other Africa	2,124	56.9	
Other Africa	733	49.0					
Middle East[1]	**1,540**	**100.0**	**10.4**	**Middle East**[1]	**1,942**	**100.0**	**3.7**
Iran	317	20.6		OPEC Countries	1,891	97.4	
Other Middle East	1,223	79.4		Other Middle East	51	2.6	
Asia and Oceania	**1,517**	**100.0**	**10.2**	**Asia and Oceania**	**8,397**	**100.0**	**16.0**
Philippines	550	36.3		Hong Kong	1,969	23.4	
India	249	16.4		Indonesia	1,334	15.9	
Hong Kong	173	11.4		Philippines	1,244	14.8	
Other Asia and Oceania	545	35.9		Other Asia and Oceania	3,850	45.9	
Other[2]	**188**	**100.0**	**1.3**	**Other**[2]	**10,874**	**100.0**	**20.8**
Total	**14,839**		**100.0**	**Total**	**52,344**		**100.0**

[1] Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Neutral Zone, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen Arab Rep., and Yemen Dem. Rep.
[2] Bermuda. Roughly 95 per cent of U.S. investment in Bermuda by year end 1980 was in finance and insurance.

NOTE: Figures represent cumulative U.S. investment as of year end 1967 and year end 1980.

SOURCES: ODC table based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. DOC, *Survey of Current Business*, Vol. 61, No. 8, August 1981, p. 32.

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countries, and the implementation of necessary domestic conservation measures. This implies the need for much greater emphasis on investment in—and research and development of—conventional and alternative sources of energy.

International Investments

U.S. investments in the third world are large, highly visible, and important to both host and home countries. These investments provide the United States with significant levels of raw materials, manufactures and income. They provide the host country with capital and technology needed to create employment opportunities.

In 1978 over 23 percent of cumulative U.S. foreign direct investment was in developing countries—about $38 billion out of a total of $163 billion. Two years later, 25 percent of foreign direct investment, valued at some $53 billion—an increase of 39 percent—was in developing countries. In the 1970–79 period, U.S. investments (excluding investments in petroleum) grew at an average annual rate of 29 percent in developing countries, while the figure for developed countries was 16 percent.

In 1980 almost 32 percent of total U.S. direct investment income came from developing countries. The third world provided by far the bulk of net U.S. service transaction earnings (i.e., income on foreign investment, plus revenues from royalties, shipping, insurance and other services)—some $23.2 billion or 64 percent of the total. Direct and other private investment income accounted for a large proportion.

U.S. private bank lending to developing countries has also been expanding rapidly. U.S. banks account for some 60 percent of total commercial bank claims on non-oil middle-income countries. U.S. bank claims on developing countries amounted to $128.6 billion in mid-1980 and had been growing at an average rate of about 30 percent per year following the oil crisis. Interest from these loans constitutes a large and growing share of U.S. banks' overall revenue.

Investment in the third world by U.S. firms, and its costs and benefits both to the United States and to the host country, has

B-3. PQLI Map of the World

NOTES: Each country's PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) is based on an average of life expectancy at age one, infant mortality, and literacy.

The 1981 population of the developed areas of North America, Europe, the U.S.S.R., Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (having PQLIs of 90 or above) totaled 1,089.1 million. The population

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

of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and parts of Europe and Oceania (having PQLIs less than 90) totaled 3,400.5.

Countries left blank are those for which a PQLI rating is not available.

SOURCE: Annex B, Table B-4.

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been the subject of intense debate over the past decade. Those who contend that foreign investment promotes American interests hold that capital flows encourage both exports and imports. Besides, they give U.S. investors a "piece of the action" that would go elsewhere if capital outflows were restricted. According to these advocates, foreign investment further benefits the United States by encouraging efficiency, raising the quantity and quality of employment, and providing access to needed raw materials. However, opponents of this view argue that foreign investment actually undermines American interests. The multinational corporations, they contend, export capital and technology and thereby "displace" domestic investment and employment.

Official policies, with few exceptions, have favored the free flow of capital and technology. The government facilitates U.S. investment in the third world both as a means of achieving "positive" U.S. gains and as a means of inducing capital formation in developing countries.

Though its overall approach has been laissez-faire, the U.S. government has not hesitated to intervene when American economic or strategic interests appeared threatened. The 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment, which provides the legal basis for suspending bilateral assistance to countries which expropriate U.S. property without prompt and adequate compensation, has been used only twice (in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia), but political and economic pressures have been applied in other cases where U.S. investments were seized. As an added protection to U.S. investors, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an independent government organization, provides insurance for certain noncommercial risks. Finally, the United States affects trade and investment policies by the ways in which it pursues foreign policy goals and ethical concerns. Examples include anticorruption rules, restrictions on trade and investment in "unfriendly" nations, and antiboycott legislation.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance has two major aims: promoting the general U.S. interest in world development and stability, and advancing

A-7. U.S. Bank Lending Abroad, 1979 and 1980 ($ millions)

	Total Claims June 1979	Total Claims June 1980
Developed Market Economies	**108,174.7**	**131,581.9**
of which:		
United Kingdom	36 515 9	42,918 3
Japan	13,500 2	17,999 4
France	9,691 2	11,467 9
Belgium-Luxembourg	6,913 3	10,983 0
Canada	5,612 8	7,844 3
Centrally Planned Economies	**5,438.5**	**5,814.9**
of which:		
Poland	1,514 9	1,743 6
German Democratic Republic	1,100 9	1,332 1
U S S R	815 4	548 7
China, People s Rep	66 4	113 2
Developing Market Economies	**109,297.7**	**128,565.0**
OPEC	19,792 6	19,857 3
of which:		
Venezuela	7,712 1	8,313 7
Indonesia	2,262 7	1,984 0
Iran	2,130 6	772 9
Algeria	1,830 4	1,669 4
Ecuador	1,540 6	1,752 1
Non-OPEC	89,505 1	108,707 7
of which:		
Brazil	13,606 9	13,991 8
Mexico	10,448 9	12,760 3
Korea, Rep	4,824 0	6,889 3
Taiwan	3,455 2	3,977 6
Argentina	3,421 4	5,643 7
Other (International and Regional Organizations)	**420.4**	**224.1**
Total	**221,331.7**	**266,186.3**

NOTES: In 1979 nearly three quarters of the claims had a maturity of one year or less; in 1980 short-term claims amounted to two thirds of the total.

SOURCES: ODC table adapted from U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., and Federal Reserve Board, "Country Exposure Lending Survey," December 14, 1979 and November 24, 1980.

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specific U.S. interests (including security interests) in the third world. In the regional breakdown of the flow of U.S. economic assistance—including security support assistance, development assistance, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) and other programs such as the Peace Corps—the Middle East is by far the largest recipient. Egypt and Israel alone accounted for over one fourth of total U.S. economic aid commitments in fiscal year 1980. This is a direct result of U.S. strategic interest in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. South Asia, with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh among the 15 top recipients of U.S. aid, is another major recipient, with assistance primarily aimed at promoting development. The Philippines and Indonesia receive large amounts of American aid, the former because of historical ties and as compensation for U.S. military bases. Direct domestic benefits from the U.S. aid program are ensured by the fact that three fourths of the budget of the Agency for International Development (AID) is spent in the United States to purchase American goods and services. The food assistance program, administered under P.L. 480, also is of direct benefit to U.S. agriculture.

In addition to these and other related interests, the United States benefits indirectly from economic growth and progress in developing countries through trade with them. Finally, and not insignificantly, the United States has a humanitarian interest in eliminating the worst aspects of global poverty, meeting the basic human needs of the world's poor, and improving political and economic conditions and human rights worldwide.

Despite the positive interests that aid serves, Americans tend to see only the costs and ignore the benefits. This is particularly true in the current climate of budgetary stringency. Some opponents of aid claim that it does not fulfill humanitarian needs and that aid recipients demonstrate little goodwill toward the United States. Besides, the argument continues, pressing domestic problems deserve prior attention. Those who hold these views have attempted to limit overall assistance and to place conditions on aid disbursements. Allocating only 0.27 percent of its gross national product to official development assistance, the United

States ranked very low compared to other donor countries in 1980.

Conflicting claims often leave the agencies interested in foreign assistance at odds over objectives. Should aid be used primarily for economic development or to promote U.S. security interests? The answer affects the functional and geographic allocation of funds. There are also differences over short-term, specific U.S. interests versus broader, long-term interests which frequently result in more efficient use of capital transfers. Administrators must also cope with such issues as aid flows to authoritarian regimes or countries ideologically opposed to the United States. These conflicts result in a rather eclectic U.S. policy, frequently unsatisfactory to both developing countries and American constituencies.

International Institutions and Systems

The United States played a leading role in the establishment of post-World War II institutions involved with international economic and political relations and security. Many systems and organizations dealing with economic matters (particularly those which emerged from the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 governing international economic transactions) and strategic concerns (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, etc.) were largely of U.S. design, and the creation of the UN system in 1945 received a strong U.S. endorsement.

Some of these institutions have been more successful than others in advancing U.S. interests. All have evolved over time, some to the liking of the United States, others not. The U.S. Administration or Congress has often reacted strongly when it saw American interests being threatened. For example, the United States temporarily withdrew from the International Labor Organization (ILO); it has attempted to block multilateral bank loans to countries it disapproved of—for example, Vietnam; and it has tried to withhold or restrict funding for the UN and its operations.

F-8. Official Development Assistance from DAC Countries, Net Flow, 1970 and 1980
($ millions, $, and percentages)

	Total Contribution ($ millions)		Per Capita Contribution ($)		Contribution as Share of GNP (%)	
Countries[1]	1970	1980	1970	1980	1970	1980
Netherlands	196	1,577	15.04	111.50	.61	.99
Norway	37	473	9.54	115.73	.32	.82
Sweden	117	923	14.54	111.00	.38	.76
Denmark	59	468	11.97	91.32	.38	.72
France	971	4,044	19.13	75.29	.66	.62
Belgium	120	581	12.45	58.98	.46	.49
Australia	202	657	16.18	44.79	.59	.48
Germany	599	3,517	9.88	57.13	.32	.43
Canada	346	1,036	16.23	43.27	.42	.42
United Kingdom	447	1,781	8.05	31.83	.36	.34
Japan	458	3,304	4.43	28.29	.23	.32
New Zealand	14	71	4.96	22.68	.23	.32
United States	**3,046**	**7,138**	**14.87**	**32.04**	**.31**	**.27**
Switzerland	30	246	4.79	38.60	.15	.24
Austria	11	174	1.48	23.17	.07	.23
Finland	7	106	1.52	22.18	.07	.22
Italy	147	672	2.74	11.78	.16	.17
DAC Total	**6,807**	**26,768**	**10.92**	**39.97**	**.34**	**.37**

[1] Ranked according to 1980 ODA as a percentage of 1980 GNP.

SOURCES: ODC table based on DAC *1975 Review*, p. 256, and *1981 Review* (Preliminary), Tables A.3 and H.1.

Specific conflicts aside, America's three principal postwar interests—the avoidance of another major world war, the prevention of another major depression, and the reconstruction of the economies of the World War II combatants—have been well served by the institutions it helped create. The conflicts and crises of recent years have not been inconsequential, but they pale against the possibilities of major war or economic collapse. Indeed that is part of the reason why the United States on the whole resists changes in these institutions.

Over the last few decades, the United States has added two

more goals to its list of priorities. The first is improving the prospects of the world's poorest people so that they can overcome the certainty of hunger, malnutrition and disease. This goal is clearly in the interest of the United States: unless it is achieved, a large portion of the world's population will permanently face conditions akin to those of war and depression.

The second objective, based on the growing recognition of a set of common problems that require cooperative action, is to deal with serious difficulties of "global-systems maintenance." Needed are solutions to environmental degradation, population growth, imbalances in food needs and supplies, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, and problems eroding the viability of the world's trading and financial systems. These are "development" issues in the broad sense of the term because they affect rich and poor countries alike.

International institutions have helped third-world development efforts to varying degrees, but most of these countries consider their progress insufficient and that an overhaul of the international economic and political institutions is necessary. The United States has resisted the NIEO proposals primarily on the ground that they will not promote development, but it also does not consider them in the U.S. interest.

The United States, however, is not totally opposed to institutional reform. For example, it did support recent changes in the structures and operations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the IMF, and many of these changes have been aimed at benefiting the developing countries. But the United States favors gradual reform implemented in such a fashion as to minimize or avoid altogether any reductions in the level of American influence. Thus the United States has been loath to dilute the significant power it exercises in the IMF, GATT, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The U.S. reaction to the increasing militancy and perceived "anti-Americanism" of the developing countries in forums such as the UN system has been to retreat to organizations which are viewed as less hostile. Finally, the decline of U.S. economic hegemony and reduced confidence in the

dollar and the role it plays in international finance have placed the United States in a defensive position vis-à-vis both developed and developing countries. The natural strategy for a country with a defensive posture is to maintain as much control as possible, avoid sweeping systemic change, and limit actions which might further damage its position.

5

The Political Process

The Executive branch of the Federal government has no centralized structure for making decisions or implementing policy on the broad range of issues that concern the developing countries. Functional areas of responsibility are widely dispersed among Federal departments and agencies, each of which jealously guards its independence and influence. Interdepartmental rivalries and conflicts are inevitable and often result in the fragmentation of policies.

The Department of State oversees relations with individual governments in the developing countries. As a group, it assigns them a lower priority than either the industrial countries or the Soviet Union and its allies. State maintains control over bilateral development assistance through its domination of AID. Because economic development is only one of State's foreign policy concerns, it often views development assistance as primarily a political instrument, a view which at times has caused major conflicts with AID.

U.S. participation in the international financial institutions and contributions to multilateral assistance efforts are managed by the Department of the Treasury, which also formulates

American policy on international monetary issues. The administration of the P.L. 480 program is jointly shared by AID and the Department of Agriculture. Trade policy, on the other hand, is negotiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in the White House, but the administration of trade policies and programs is divided among a myriad of departments and agencies, including the United States International Trade Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the Departments of Treasury, State, Labor, Agriculture and Commerce. The Department of Defense oversees military sales, but other departments, primarily State, influence the process. Investment policies fall within the domain of Treasury and Commerce, but OPIC is a separate agency, and State maintains some measure of say in this area.

With authority so diffused, the role of individuals often becomes exceedingly important. Precisely who does—and who does not—dominate the bureaucracy varies from time to time and from Administration to Administration. In the Nixon and Ford years, the struggles between Treasury and State on policy concerning the developing countries were legion. The then Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon and his subordinates felt very strong that the proposals of the developing countries for a NIEO were contrary to American interests and indeed to the laws of economics. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, however, was prepared to compromise with the developing countries for both economic and political reasons. Kissinger, probably because of his preeminence in foreign policy-making in those years, prevailed over Treasury, but not without mammoth bureaucratic struggles. These often resulted in U.S. policy being enunciated too late to be effective, as was the case with Kissinger's ill-fated 1976 plan for an international resources bank to finance investments in raw-materials production. Under the Carter Administration, much of the decision-making on North-South issues was concentrated in State, but within the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs rather than the Bureau of International Organization Affairs or AID. Again the problem of coordinating policies with other agencies arose.

Treasury's resistance to centralizing decisions on foreign assistance crippled reorganization attempts, and laborious efforts to negotiate positions within the Executive branch were difficult and time-consuming.

In the American Federal system, there are two textbook solutions for dealing with policies that involve a number of Cabinet departments and agencies: either all existing programs are combined in one separate "super agency," or they are coordinated within the White House. Both approaches have been tried in recent years. In 1973 a Development Coordination Committee was created by congressional action to orchestrate many of the diverse programs relating to U.S. interests in the developing countries. The committee was not effective in the Nixon, Ford or Carter years.

In response to congressional pressure, the Carter Administration in 1979 drew up a plan for the reorganization of the U.S. foreign aid program. That attempt to streamline policy-making established the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) to administer and coordinate—but not operate—most U.S. foreign aid programs. IDCA oversaw the activities of AID, OPIC and some aspects of the Administration's participation in the development efforts of the UN and the multilateral and regional development banks and agencies. The director of IDCA was principal adviser to the President on international development matters as well as trade, science and technology, and other matters significantly affecting the developing countries. The director reported to the President, and, on foreign policy matters, to the Secretary of State. These arrangements proved at best "half a loaf." The mandate of the new agency did not include authority over the multilateral development banks, and the relationship with AID took many months to work out.

The other strategy—coordination through the White House—also has been tried with varying degrees of success during the past few years. The Carter Administration restructured the National Security Council staff to oversee relations with the developing countries, but policy coordination proved difficult. The underlying problem was a lack of priority for North-South

issues on the part of the President and his chief advisers. Without the interest of the Chief Executive, or at least his surrogate in the field of foreign affairs, no amount of organizational tinkering can change the low priority accorded to relations with the developing countries. The result has been a lack of coherence and follow-through on most North-South issues.

The Unique Role of Congress

Congress plays a role in determining foreign policy that is perhaps unique among the industrial countries. It shares authority over foreign policy—including power over war, treaties, appointments, and commerce—with the Executive. In addition, Congress wields effective control over budgetary authorizations and appropriations, including foreign assistance expenditures. This wide range of powers gives Congress the opportunity to negate Executive branch initiatives if it so wishes or, alternatively, to put forward its own programs. Power, though, is much more widely dispersed within Congress than within the Executive branch. For example, 13 of 19 standing committees have some responsibility for foreign economic expenditures and legislation, and almost 50 subcommittees have some jurisdiction over issues significantly affecting developing countries. In contrast with parliamentary democracies, party discipline is weak. Douglas J. Bennet, a former Senate staff member and director of AID, has pointed out that "partisanship does not bind the majority in Congress to the White House as much as the separation of powers separates them."

American history is replete with examples of Congress thwarting the international programs of American Presidents, the most notable example being the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. In the post-1945 period, however, Congress shared the Administration's general perception of American interests in the developing countries. As a result, it supported large military and economic aid programs, as well as a series of security treaties linking the United States to other countries.

Since the mid-1960s, however, Congress' view of its role in

foreign affairs has undergone a considerable change. The Vietnam war was the major catalyst, with Congress particularly concerned over the "blank check" it had voted President Lyndon B. Johnson in the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Revelations of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, not only in Chile but throughout the world, and the Watergate scandals which led to President Richard M. Nixon's resignation heightened congressional concern over excessive use (or abuse) of power by the Executive. Consequently, Congress passed a series of measures designed to limit the President's authority to commit American troops and engage in armed conflict. Congress today must approve all arms sales agreements over $14 million; it has oversight of foreign intelligence operations; and it also informally approves all development cooperation grants made by AID before that agency enters into an agreement with a foreign country.

Congress' recent record in foreign affairs is mixed. The Executive branch maintains that legislators have been mainly obstructive. Congress claims that on some issues, particularly in the area of international development policy, it has taken a constructive lead role. It was Congress, not the Executive, that initiated the reforms of the American foreign aid program to focus it on basic human needs in 1973. And it was Congress that drafted the proposals for reforming the organization of the U.S. government so that development issues could be dealt with comprehensively. The pressure to tie aid to a government's record on human rights originated in Congress, as did the requirement that food aid go predominantly to the poorest countries rather than to those countries in which the United States has a strategic interest. At the same time that congressional participation has increased, so too have special interest amendments to foreign policy legislation, such as lending conditions on contributions to international development banks.

The Budget Process

Decision-making within the American government is closely tied to the process of formulating, authorizing, and appropriating

the annual Federal budget. The budget itself has become the main vehicle for determining Federal defense and domestic social policy. The process works well except for those areas of public policy that are not large budgetary items. Although foreign aid, for example, is only a small part of the overall transactions between the United States and the third world (it is dwarfed by trade, investment and private bank lending), the annual foreign aid legislation tends to dominate discussions of policy toward the developing countries. As the aid bill winds its way through the legislative process, it consumes an inordinate amount of time and attention of both the Executive branch and Congress.

Interest Groups

A variety of organized interest groups affect American policies toward the developing countries. Trade unions, for instance, which generally have played a leadership role in social reform efforts in the United States, remain a potent political force despite the fact that the overall rate of unionization of the labor force has fallen from 33 percent in the mid-1950s to 24 percent in 1978. Many unions in recent years have hardened their outlook on relations with the developing countries for reasons of both self-interest and altered domestic economic conditions. Until the mid-1960s, when the United States still enjoyed a monopoly in the manufacture of capital- and technology-intensive products, the unions favored free trade and open markets. But as the trade balance swung into deficit and the U.S. manufacturing sector diminished relative to the service sector, some unions altered their stance. (The share of goods in total U.S. output fell from 50 percent in 1960 to 43 percent in 1980, whereas the share of services rose from 38 percent to 47 percent over the same period.) Organized labor still continues to support aid to the developing countries, but would like to see it focused more narrowly on the poorest countries. Labor is worried that the transfer of technology will lead to the loss of American jobs. Indeed, outflows of private capital, whether government subsidized or not, are seen as exporting U.S. jobs to the third world, and technology transfers are seen as selling the "U.S. heritage."

Individual labor unions' attitudes toward trade vary widely, depending on the industry. Unions in industries hardest hit by imports from the developing countries (textiles, shoes and electronics) strongly favor restrictions on trade, while those whose members benefit from exports (aerospace, agricultural implements, chemicals, and farm products) urge more liberalized trade. Almost all unions, however, complain that the interests of labor are not taken into account in the formulation of international economic policies, particularly toward the developing countries.

On the whole, the business sector tends to have fewer reservations than labor about the supposedly adverse effects of trade liberalization. In most cases business is more mobile and thus better able to adapt to changing circumstances. Many firms benefit directly from trade with the third world, either as a source of raw materials or a market for manufactured goods. U.S. banks generate significant profits on their lending activities in developing countries. Some industries, however, are threatened by the competition of imports from the developing countries and have become increasingly protectionist. This is particularly true of steel, electronics and textiles.

The business community carries considerable weight in the political process. Corporations act collectively through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, industry associations, and The Business Roundtable, a group of high-level corporate leaders. In addition, individual corporations and business leaders influence policy-making through contributions to political campaigns.

The business sector's overall impact on U.S. policy toward the developing countries has been mixed. Business organizations have long supported programs of foreign assistance, and individual corporate leaders have spoken publicly on the importance of the developing countries' growth to progress in the United States. But the major efforts usually are put into specific programs of direct interest to particular corporations. Thus the textile and footwear industries have lobbied for protection against foreign imports, while major exporting corporations have pressed for

expansion of export credits and trade liberalization measures.

U.S. business strategy toward developing countries has been remarkably pragmatic. Particularly in the past five years, corporations abroad have adapted to local governments which embrace a variety of ideologies, provided they met business' needs for profit and predictability. Thus there has been a rapid growth of American interest in investments in China, not to mention agreements with such "radical" states as Algeria for oil and liquified natural gas. American oil companies have had no qualms about cooperating with a Marxist regime in Angola, which the Executive branch continues to oppose strongly on ideological grounds.

One sector of the U.S. business community with a particularly strong interest in relations with developing countries and strong influence over U.S. policies is American agriculture. Farmers and agribusinesses have long supported food sales and aid to the third world, but they have also deplored rising imports of competing products and commodity agreements considered detrimental to their interests.

The lack of an adequate adjustment mechanism to assist industries hurt by foreign competition has stiffened opposition to freer trade. While the United States is in many ways in a stronger economic position than some of the other OECD countries, it lacks a basic set of policies to deal with domestic economic dislocation caused by trade with the developing countries or other reasons, such as migration of industry within the United States. Adjustment policies are inadequate at several levels. For instance, the United States is the only industrial country (except for South Africa) without some type of national health care plan, and legal provisions enabling workers to transfer pension credits when they switch jobs are still rudimentary. Furthermore, the government lacks coordinated policies to deal with changes in a rapidly evolving world economy.

Trade adjustment assistance was first enacted into law in 1962, but no benefits were paid until 1969. Even now the Federal programs designed to provide this assistance are unable to meet the needs of the very small percentage of workers who

lose their jobs due to import competition. As a result, there is a strong feeling in the American labor movement and among some businessmen that the costs of economic dislocation and change fall most heavily on them.

Other interest groups that from time to time have influenced the formulation of U.S. policies toward the developing countries are consumers interested in imports of low-cost manufactures from the third world. The consumer lobby is growing in size but as yet carries little weight. Religious and other public-interest organizations, on the other hand, have grown in strength and importance since the food crisis in the early 1970s and the subsequent World Food Conference. They are the nucleus of a fledgling development lobby that has succeeded in increasing public backing for foreign aid in the United States at a time when most pressures are pushing in the other direction. In addition there are "single issue" pressure groups operating in such areas as human rights, population and the environment that have had some effect on U.S. policy. Environmentalists, for instance, have lobbied for the application of domestic environmental standards to all U.S. aid programs, export credit financing, and investment insurance.

Minority and Ethnic Groups

Minority and ethnic groups also exert an influence on American policy toward the developing countries, often in a voice that has more impact than the size of the bloc might indicate. As Senator Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs*, "The 'secret weapon' of ethnic interest groups is neither money nor technique, which are available to other interest groups as well, but the ability to galvanize for specific political objectives the strong emotional bonds of large numbers of Americans to their cultural or ancestral homes." The impact of the Jewish constituency on American policy in the Middle East is perhaps the best known example. In recent years a similar role has been played by other groups. For instance, Americans of Greek descent successfully opposed resumption of American arms aid and sales to Turkey, pending a resolution of the

Greek-Turkish dispute of 1974 over Cyprus. In this case, a relatively small constituency with well-placed congressional support could block a major program of support for a NATO ally whom the President called crucial to America's interests.

There is also a growing interest by black Americans in U.S. policy toward Africa as a result of raised consciousness over civil rights within the United States. There is a growing unwillingness among black Americans to see the United States continue to support white-dominated regimes, particularly in southern Africa. Expression of that opinion helped influence President Carter's decision in 1977 not to lift economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

In addition, the emergence of what is now known as Mex-America (the Mexican community within the United States) and the growing strength of Spanish-speaking voters in some crucial states, particularly in the Southwest, mean that American policies toward Mexico and the rest of Latin America may at some time in the future be subject to domestic pressures not dissimilar to that exerted by American Jews on Middle East policy.

Developing-country issues in general, however, are given low priority by most people in the United States. There is still a considerable gap between the public and the leadership in understanding the growing U.S. economic interdependence with the developing countries and the need to make adjustments over the long term. Americans may not give as much thought as they should to developing countries, but there is strong support for humanitarian programs. Surveys of American attitudes toward poverty and development have concluded again and again that Americans feel a responsibility for contributing directly to programs which reach poor people in developing countries. For this reason, support for the concept of aid for basic human needs is considerable. Proof of that lies in the fact that on a per capita basis, voluntary contributions by Americans to agencies with programs in the developing countries are higher than those of most other developed countries.

6

Needed: A Development Strategy

The complex admixture of interests, tangible and intangible, that comes into play on any specific U.S.-third world issue makes it very difficult to assess the extent to which the general philosophy of any U.S. Administration (which theoretically defines and pursues the collective U.S. interest) is translated into policy. Indeed, one would be hard put to name an Administration that had both a comprehensive view of the third world and a consistent set of policies to match that view.

The first year of the Reagan Administration was marked by a renewed emphasis on the overriding importance of military security and on the need to restore American power. Its focus therefore has been on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union, including its activities in the developing countries. This has been joined by an equal preoccupation with radical governments, such as Cuba and Libya, which are seen to be acting contrary to U.S. interests in the third world. In the economic sphere, the Administration has shown a clear preference for bilateral relations rather than working with multilateral institutions in which the United States has been a leader since World

War II. It has put a heavy emphasis on private enterprise and market forces in economic development.

At the heart of the Administration's policies is a shift in interpretation of four key issues, each of which has historically been a focal point of U.S. foreign policy:

1. The intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union, and the appropriate U.S. response to Soviet actions.
2. The uses of U.S. military power, especially in the third world.
3. The risks of instability in developing countries.
4. The nature of U.S. economic interests abroad.

The Role of the Soviet Union

U.S. foreign policy since the mid-1940s has been dominated by two contrasting views of the Soviet Union. Proponents of one school believe that the Soviet Union is an international revolutionary state committed to unrelenting ideological warfare and powered by a messianic drive for world domination. Others, while not ignoring competition with the Soviet Union, de-emphasize the role of ideology and view the U.S.S.R. as a traditional great power attempting to expand its reach within the existing international systems through a defensive rather than offensive strategy.

Those who feel that the Soviet Union is bent on endlessly expanding its power believe strongly that competition with the U.S.S.R. *must* remain the central focus of all U.S. policy; other issues are of secondary importance at best, or must be viewed in light of the relationship with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, those who see the Soviet Union as a powerful but essentially defensive nation-state suggest that other foreign policy issues should be dealt with on their own merits.

During the second half of the Carter Administration concern over the Soviet threat rose significantly, with important implications for U.S.-third world relations. Soviet activities in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and southern Africa were seen as evidence of the U.S.S.R.'s renewed expansionist drive, and many worried about the Soviet potential for cutting off the West's supply of oil from

the Persian Gulf area. In an era of increasing Soviet assertiveness, the relative decline in American military power was seen as an invitation to Soviet adventurism, particularly in the third world.

This viewpoint is even more strongly marked in the pronouncements of the Reagan Administration. As Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. stated in April 1981, a "major focus of American policy must be the Soviet Union, not because of ideological preoccupation, but simply because Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today. . .Soviet promotion of violence as the instrument of change constitutes the greatest danger to the world." This perspective has prompted a series of decisions about alliances with developing countries, policy priorities, and the allocation of assistance between security and development programs, with priority given to the former.

The Uses of Power

America suffered a series of military and economic setbacks in the 1970s, leading to a reduction in U.S. influence and a blow to U.S. pride. While some of these events were inevitable, together they precipitated a backlash—a strong feeling among influential groups that the United States must give priority to restoring its military strength and not shrink from using it, if need be. The emerging consensus became dramatically apparent during the 1980 presidential campaign. The Reagan Administration seems intent on carrying through its program to restore American military and economic supremacy. Moreover, there are indications that it is prepared to rely increasingly on the use of force—where necessary, military force—to defend and further U.S. interests. It is a view that meets the approval of most conservatives. Irving Kristol, for example, writing in *The Wall Street Journal*, notes that, "Our first and overriding obligation clearly is to defend the interests of those existing liberal democracies that are our own natural allies. To achieve this, however, we must be ready to defend our strategic and economic interests as a world power, willing and able to use the necessary force to do so. This earth will be a place where American ideals are

respected only if the world respects our *interests*—which it is not likely to do if we show no respect for our own interests."

That same sense of militancy is reflected in the current emphasis on increased military expenditures and capabilities; a marked increase in U.S. arms sales to the developing countries; the negotiation of base agreements; and the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that can move troops quickly to any part of the world. The geographic focus for the moment is the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean and Central America.

Change versus Stability

Another facet of this heightened concern over Soviet "meddling" in the third world is a growing feeling that change in developing countries is dangerously destabilizing and therefore as often as not inimical to American interests. Those who hold this view do not impute all change to the Soviet Union, but they are concerned about the opportunities that instability in developing countries—in Iran, El Salvador or southern Africa, for example—opens up for increased Soviet influence.

One response has been the Reagan Administration's proposal for a Caribbean Basin Initiative, an ambitious set of economic programs designed to promote development and security in the countries of the Caribbean and Central America.

Economic Interests

Economic policies toward developing countries are far less crystallized than those related to security matters. Many policy analysts view U.S. relations with the developing world as peripheral to the economic interests of the United States. Notes political scientist Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University, in *Foreign Affairs*, "Our fate does not otherwise depend on the change occurring in the third world. If oil is the great exception, we can otherwise accommodate ourselves to a third world that remains quite unstable for an indefinite period. Even more, we can remain relatively indifferent to most of the change taking place in the developing countries. This indifference expresses, in turn, an indifference to the prospect that much of the developing

world may find us as historically irrelevant as we find them less than vital to our interests."

From this standpoint the existing economic order has worked well, and there is no compelling reason to change it. But even among those who hold such views, there is a growing concern about U.S. access to natural resources. To quote Secretary Haig, "The industrial democracies' growing dependence on imports from volatile regions in the third world—from the Middle East in the case of petroleum or from southern Africa with respect to vital minerals—demands that all NATO members pay close attention to developments within these regions. If instability in those areas is sparked by internal conflicts or external meddling, the consequences for the West could be disastrous. The growing resource power of the third world reflects the broader trend of a diffusion of power, indeed, a transformation in the post-World War II international environment."

Global Negotiations

In its first year in office, the Reagan Administration showed that it was at least as skeptical as its predecessors about global economic negotiations and efforts to effect basic institutional reforms. Most policy decisions were held in abeyance pending the Administration's overall review of U.S.-third world relations. For example, completion of the Law of the Sea Treaty, negotiated over the past ten years during both Democratic and Republican Administrations, was postponed due to new U.S. reservations. In addition, the United States sets strong conditions for its participation in global negotiations on economic issues, hence delaying a new round of the North-South dialogue.

The President did, however, agree to participate in the North-South economic summit meeting in Cancún. In the weeks before the meeting, the Administration's basic policy toward U.S.-third world relations began to unfold in speeches given by the President and several of his Cabinet secretaries. Three tenets of economic strategy emerge from these pronouncements and from actual policy decisions: the primacy of security concerns and competition with the Soviet Union and its allies; the importance

of private enterprise in development and in international relations; and a preference for bilateral over multilateral forms of cooperation.

Nearly every official statement on North-South economic relations contains direct references to the failure of the Soviet Union and its allies to contribute to cooperative efforts, as well as to the weaknesses of socialist or Communist economic systems. In terms of actual policies, the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative contains a clearly defined strategic objective, aimed at blunting Soviet adventurism in the Western Hemisphere.

If anything can be said with certainty about the Reagan Administration's view toward North-South issues, it is a clear and strong preference to leave the management of international transactions to market mechanisms and the private sector. It stems from the genuinely held conviction that the solution to the problems of poverty and insufficient economic development is to be found, in the words of the President, "in the magic of the market place." This is a direct corollary to the Administration's domestic economic philosophy which favors a reduction in the role of the government both as an economic entity and as a regulator of private market transactions. In the international economy, this would suggest that the appropriate government actions would be those which increase incentives for, and reduce impediments to, private flows of goods, services and capital.

The Administration's private sector approach has been manifested in policy decisions, primarily in the trade area. The Administration removed quotas on imports of shoes from Taiwan and South Korea, proposed liberalized trade rules on imports from Caribbean basin nations, and has taken a strong interest in the forthcoming GATT ministerial meeting, to be held in November 1982. The United States did, however, accede to the more restrictive stance of the European Community during the final stages of negotiation for a new Multifiber Arrangement, which governs quotas set on textile trade.

Turning to investment, the Administration has placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for private capital flows to complement or even replace government-to-government aid.

Interest in bilateral investment treaties and in the International Finance Corporation (the World Bank affiliate that extends loans and equity to private-sector ventures in developing countries) has been rekindled, and a new Private Enterprise Bureau has been created within AID. The Administration has also opposed new restrictions on foreign investments: for example, U.S. reservations about the Law of the Sea Treaty were primarily focused on potential limitations on the activities of multinational mineral firms, and the United States voted against the World Health Organization's infant formula code, which called for nations to undertake a greater regulatory role in the marketing of baby formula.

Finally, the Reagan Administration has taken an interest in reversing the decade-long trend of shifting from bilateral to multilateral forms of economic cooperation. The primary rationale for focusing on bilateral relationships is to tailor U.S. policy instruments, such as foreign aid, more closely to specific American interests. The Department of the Treasury report on U.S. participation in multilateral development banks, published in February 1982, proposed that U.S. contributions to those institutions be reduced, in part due to concerns over lack of sufficient U.S. control over development bank lending policies. And the Caribbean Basin Initiative, while covering a number of separate national entities, is designed to be implemented primarily through a series of bilateral trade, assistance and investment measures.

Defining Interests

As yet the Administration has not articulated a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the third world. A marked disparity exists between U.S. interests in the developing countries and the low priority U.S. policy-makers still assign them. The longer the disparity continues, the more opportunities will be missed, the higher the costs to this country, and the greater the risk of permanently losing the leadership role the United States has played for so long in encouraging international development cooperation.

There is of course no one overarching U.S. interest in the third world but rather a multiplicity of interests—complex, overlapping, often even conflicting. The United States needs to develop a broad definition of those interests—one that encompasses and balances its own political, security, economic and humanitarian objectives and is sensitive to those of other nations.

In seeking a comprehensive definition, it is useful to return to the four central issues raised earlier. No one can dispute the fact that what transpires between the United States and the Soviet Union will ultimately determine whether or not the world stays at peace, at least in the foreseeable future. There have, however, been countless trends and events affecting North-South interests (wars, famines, embargoes, and the positive aspects of commercial relations) that have *not* involved the Soviet Union. There are times and areas where the actions of the Soviet Union may be important, but there are others where they may not. For example, there are certain places in the third world where Western interests are paramount and where actual or potential Soviet influence is a very serious question indeed—the Persian Gulf, for example. There are other areas, such as Central America or southern Africa, where the problems are more complex and Soviet influence far more tenuous. Approaching all issues and areas through the "East-West prism" can in many cases damage U.S. interests.

Looking at the uses of power, one cannot disagree with the U.S. need to be prepared to defend its key interests if these are challenged, but the use of military power to achieve America's objectives in the developing countries does not always pass the test of either efficacy or morality. A classic example is the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for which the United States received no benefits and bore high costs. The debate over American military involvement in Central America is a current illustration. A Brookings Institution study has identified 215 incidents since the end of World War II (185 of which were in developing countries) where U.S. forces were used for political purposes, and concluded that the use of military force has only a short-term effect and is no substitute for long-term diplomacy. Political scientist Stanley

Hoffmann has observed that "Military power is of little use, either when the objectives we try to achieve are economic or when the threat to our economic security could be worsened by sending in the Marines." In sum, there is a range of other nonmilitary elements of national power—primarily strong economic and diplomatic relations—that can be much more effective than military force and need to be emphasized if peace is the ultimate objective.

Change may be destabilizing, but it is inevitable in a rapidly evolving world and does not necessarily work against longer-term U.S. interests. One of the great strengths of the American system is its adaptability and capacity to absorb change. This strength needs to be translated into the international system. Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance declared in a commencement address at Harvard University in 1980 that the United States faces a "world undergoing rapid change, with growing expectations, better education, quickened communications; a world in which neither the United States nor any other country commands a preponderance of power or a monopoly of wisdom. It is a world of conflicts, among nations and values, among social systems and emerging new interests. It is a world in which competitive superpowers hold in their hands our common survival, yet paradoxically find it beyond their power to order events." In such a world, change should be managed and channeled as peacefully as possible. The peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe and the negotiation and ratification of a new agreement with Panama over the governance of the Panama Canal provide recent examples of successful accommodations to change.

Finally, the importance of the developing countries to America's economic well-being should be acknowledged and an appropriate response made to their proposals for change. Many Americans feel that the current international economic system is working fairly well, not only for the rich countries but also for the poor—and that what is needed is not a new order but rather some gradual reforms in the existing order. This assessment may have held true until recently, but there are enough strains building now—trade stagnation, large current account imbal-

ances, increasing debt-servicing problems—to indicate that the current system does not have sufficient capacity to manage the overload indefinitely. It is not alarmist to recognize the need for reforms, whether arrived at in some form of global economic negotiations or carried out within existing institutional structures.

Global Problems, Multilateral Solutions

A balance must be struck between the need to achieve global cooperation to deal with major international problems on the one hand and to accommodate legitimate U.S. military security concerns on the other. The ability or inability to balance these two agendas may mark the success or failure of American foreign policy in the 1980s.

The fact that all nations—East and West, North and South—face a set of political, economic, social and environmental problems which cannot be resolved without extraordinary cooperative measures has become increasingly apparent over the past decade. Overcoming many of these problems is beyond the ability of any single nation-state. Many of them do not lend themselves to bilateral approaches—the spread of ocean pollutants, for example, or the depletion of the earth's protective ozone shield. Because of the complexity of dealing with such issues as nuclear proliferation, the environment, outer space, energy and food, multilateral action is imperative, and the role of the developing world has become vital. Unless solutions are found, the *Global 2000 Report to the President* warned, "The world in 2000 will be much more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. . . . Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends."

A Malthusian type of global apocalypse—when the world's population has outstripped its means of subsistence—may not be inevitable, but the events of the 1970s and early 1980s provide enough evidence that greater international efforts are required to

reduce even the slightest chance of such an outcome. The national interest in such efforts may be difficult to calculate precisely, but is nevertheless obvious.

Perhaps the most important U.S. interest to be pursued, one which deals with the world as it now is and as it could be, is to help build a world with greater human dignity, well-being and freedom. Americans have been fortunate to be blessed with greater amounts of these "assets" than most other nations, and it has been abhorrent to many—though not all—sectors of American opinion that U.S. relative prosperity should coexist with the extremes of poverty in the third world. Hence there is a fundamental moral obligation to assist in the removal of poverty's worst aspects at least, if not poverty itself.

The United States still has the ability to calculate its own needs and implement policies that advance its own interests even at the expense of others. Unique among the industrial countries, the United States probably could benefit from a self-serving approach, at least in the short run, even if this meant running the risk of further dividing the international system and alienating the developing countries. Alternatively, the United States could take a long-run view of its relations with the third world and consider improvements as investments which will bring future returns, even at short-term cost. To do so, however, American attitudes, policies and governmental structures, fashioned in an era of abundance and relative isolation from the outside world, will have to be changed to fit an era of limits.

If the United States and other countries do not begin now to seek solutions to common problems, they will all face slower growth, higher prices, and a world system more vulnerable to disruption. On the other hand, by concerted attention to these problems, it is possible to restore growth and stability and measurably increase the well-being of people everywhere. Favorable outcomes are possible, with benefits accruing to all, if national interests are defined and sought appropriately. Herein lies the real U.S. interest.

Talking It Over

A Note for Students and Discussion Groups

This pamphlet, like its predecessors in the HEADLINE SERIES, is published for every serious reader, specialized or not, who takes an interest in the subject. Many of our readers will be in classrooms, seminars or community discussion groups. Particularly with them in mind, we present below some discussion questions—suggested as a starting point only—and references for further reading.

Discussion Questions

U.S. relations with the third world are shaped by various strategic, economic and humanitarian objectives. Which, if any, of these should be given primary consideration? When are these objectives contradictory, and when complementary?

How would you approach the task of designing a set of U.S. policies toward the third world that takes into consideration both political unity and economic diversity among developing nations?

The authors focus their arguments on growing levels of interdependence among countries. Is this trend inevitable, or would it be possible or desirable for the United States to "go it alone"?

Do you view the developing countries as representing an increasing threat to U.S. security, or as areas of opportunity for mutually beneficial relations?

To what extent are third-world products and markets important to Americans' well-being? In your opinion, is the public aware of the third world's importance? If not, how could public awareness be raised?

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

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